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NOTES
REAL ESTATE BROKERS CONTRACTS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
There has been a great deal of litigation concerning real estate
brokers and their rights to commissions. Most of the disputes
have arisen out of the fact that the terms of the brokerage agree-
ment were too vague or because the agreement was never reduced
to a writing and the parties were forced to depend on parol evi-
dence in order to prove the contract. Even in cases where there
were written agreements, often there were no clear provisions con-
cerning the important specifications of property to be sold or
commission to be paid.1 This note focuses upon the problem of
determining when a broker has sufficiently performed the re-
quested services to entitle him to his commission. Matters col-
lateral to the central consideration, such as proof, pleading and
evidence, will be noted only to clarify or supplement specific
areas, and no attempt has been made to treat these areas ex-
tensively.
I. EMPLOYMNT AND AuTHonrY
A. Nature of Relatiom and Contract of Employment
A real estate broker is one engaged by another on a commis-
sion basis to negotiate contracts concerning property which is
not in the broker's custody.2 Every broker is an agent, but he
differs from other agents in that he is an intermediary or middle-
man and is in a sense the agent of both vendor and vendee.3 It
might be noted here that in most states the business or occupation
of a broker is state regulated and subject to license and taxation.4
There is a relationship of special agency existing between a
real estate broker and one who employs him to purchase, sell or
1. See 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 50 (1963).
2. A real estate broker is a special agent employed to find a prospective
purchaser and to bring him to the owner of the land offered for sale, who
completes the sale with the purchaser or, if the contract so provides, to con-
summate the sale without the owner's participation. Charles v. West, 155 S.C.
488, 492, 152 S.E. 644, 645 (1930); Williamson v. Taylor, 129 S.C. 400, 124
S.E. 645 (1924), 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 1 (1938).
3. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 3 (1938).
4. S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-1545 (1962) requires brokers to be licensed and
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to act as a real estate broker
without first obtaining a license, and any person violating the provisions of the
statute shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 606 (1955).
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otherwise deal with real estate.5 A contract of employment is
necessary to create and maintain this relationship. This contract
is governed by ordinary contract law and usually may be either
express or implied. Normally all that is necessary to create a
brokerage contract is that the acts of the broker must be carried
out with the written, oral or implied consent of the principal.
By leaving a description of property at a broker's office with
a request that the broker sell the property at a stipulated price
and on stipulated terms, a principal employs the broker. On the
other hand the mere fact that a broker asks and obtains from
the owner of land the price he is asking for the property does
not of itself establish the principal-agency relationship.6
In some instances the employment of a broker may be by a
bilateral contract in which the consideration for the promise of
one party is a promise on the part of the other.7 However, the
ordinary listing agreement is, at least when made, a unilateral
contract which does not obligate the broker to do anything. Such
a contract lacks mutuality and is unenforceable.8 It has been
held, however, that a broker's expenditure of time or money to
find a purchaser or his consummation of the undertaking is
sufficient consideration for the promise to pay a commission and
makes the agreement bilateral and binding.9 Whatever the form
of the contract may be, in order to establish its validity three
things must be shown: a meeting of the minds of the parties
through offer and acceptance; a sufficient consideration for the
employment, and the existence of definite and certain terms.' 0
B. Neoessity of WMiting
Some controversy has arisen as to whether contracts hiring
brokers to sell or purchase land come within the statute of frauds
provision concerning contracts for the sale of land or an interest
therein. It is generally held that such an agreement need not
5. Charles v. West, 155 S.C. 488, 152 S.E. 644 (1930); Edwards v. Cole-
man, 139 S.C. 369, 138 S.E. 42 (1927); Williamson v. Taylor, 129 S.C. 400,
124 S.E. 645 (1924).
6. See Annot., 49 A.L.R. 933 (1927); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 842 (1926); See
12 CJ.S. Brokers § 12 (1938).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 445, comment f (1958).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 445, comment c (1958).
9. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 32 (1964); see 1 CoRniN, CONTRACTS § 50
(1963).
10. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 31 (1964); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 12 (1938).
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be in writing unless a written contract is required by statute.1
The South Carolina case, Carter v. McCal, 12 involved an oral
contract under which a broker had agreed to negotiate the pur-
chase of a tract of land and then to sell it off in lots. As con-
sideration for his services, he was to receive a commission on the
lot sales and a portion of value of the lots remaining unsold. This
contract was held not to be within the provisions of the statute
of frauds relating to sale of lands or interest in them. In many
jurisdictions, however, there are statutes requiring that a contract
of employment between a principal and a real estate broker be in
writing.
13
C. Duration and Termination of Agenwy
The duration of a broker's employment depends on the in-
tention of the parties. 'Employment may continue for either the
definite period of time stated in the contract or for a reasonable
time if the contract does not specify a definite time limit.14 An
agency unlimited as to duration may be terminated at will by
either party if reasonable notice is given and the termination is
in good faith. Generally the principal has the power to revoke
the agency at any time and for any reason. However, the prin-
cipal does not have the power to revoke the broker's agency
where it is coupled with an interest in the subject matter," or
where the authority is given for a specified time for a valuable
consideration, 16 or is necessary to effect a security.1
11. Carter v. McCall, 193 S.C. 456, 8 S.E.2d 844 (1940); Jumper v. Dor-
chester Lumber Co., 119 S.C. 171, 111 S.E. 881 (1922). See Annot., 151
A.L.R. 648 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), AGENCY § 54 (1958).
12. 193 S.C. 456, 8 S.E2d 844 (1940).
13. See, e.g., CAL. CIViL CODE § 1624 (1954); IND. STAT. ANN. § 33-104
(1949); N. J. REv. STAT. tit. 25, ch. 1, § 9 (1937); ORE. REV. STAT. § 41-580
(1959); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 28 (1960); Wis. SEss.
LAws, ch. 383 (1965); Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 747 (1950); RESTATEmENT (SEc-
OND), AGENCY § 468 (1958). See 13 S.C.L.Q. 539 (1961), as to the insuffi-
ciency of written agreement (required by statute) authorizing broker to sell
real estate where no statement of commission to be paid is included.
14. See RESTATFAENT (SEcoNm), AGENCY § 106 (1958). See 7 S.C.L.Q. 654
(1955) on duration of real estate broker's contract when no time is specified.
Annot., 28 A.L.R. 893 (1924) ; Annot, 24 A.L.R. 1537 (1923).
15. Carter v. McCall, 193 S.C. 456, 8 S.E.2d 844 (1940). In George H.
Rucker & Co. v. Glenna, 130 Va. 511, 107 S.E. 725 (1921), the court said,
"Coupled with an interest means a writing creating, conveying to, or vesting
in the agent an interest in the estate or property which is the subject of the
agency . . . ." See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1953).
16. McCallum v. Grier, 86 S.C. 162, 68 S.E. 466 (1910).
17. Thompson v. Walter, 70 N.Y.S.2d 395, 188 Misc. 316 (1947).
19661
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A simple agency to sell property is generally revocable at any
time before the broker carries out a substantial act in perform-
ance of the agency, or makes a sale, or finds a purchaser that is
ready, willing and able to purchase on the terms given by the
principal. This power to revoke is not affected by the facts that
the contract provided for a fixed time of employment, that a
reasonable time has not elapsed, that his power to sell was made
exclusive, or that it was not subject to cancellation without the
written consent of both parties."8
The power to revoke must be distinguished from the right to
revoke without incurring liability for breach of contract.19 Al-
though the law will not compel a continuance of the agency, there
may be a liability for wrongful termination, at least where a
definite period was agreed upon. In such a case the principal is
liable for any damages that are the proximate result of his termi-
nation unless such revocation was for good cause.
20
Ordinarily, in the absence of a contract for a definite period,
a broker has no cause of action for the principal's revocation.
However, where a time is fixed by the contract, a broker can
recover damages for a wrongful revocation of his agency that
occurred before the expiration of the time limit. Exemplary of
this is where a revocation made during such period after he
has expended time and money in performance of the contract, or
has performed services,21 or begun negotiations, or where revoca-
tion comes before the broker has had a reasonable opportunity to
make a sale or find a purchaser. 22 He must show, however, that
he could have made a sale or produced a suitable purchaser with-
in such time or within the time specified in the contract.
Revocation may be made in any manner which shows the prin-
cipal's intention to withdraw the authority from the broker, and
it may be made verbally even though the contract of agency was
in writing.
28
18. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 16 (1938).
19. Piper v. Wells, 175 Md. 326, 2 A2d 28 (1938); See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 118 (1958).
20. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers §§ 55-56 (1964) ; 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 50
(1963); See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 450 (1958).
21. In Carter v. McCall, 193 S.C. 456, 8 S.E.2d 844 (1940), a broker who
had fully performed obligation at time of revocation was entitled to recover
compensation for services rendered after the agreement was made and before
its repudiation.
22. Kolb v. Nash, 245 S.C. 25, 138 S.E.2d 417 (1964). Here the owner sold
the land before broker's time expired under the contract.
23. See 3 Am. JuR. 2d Agetwy § 39 (1962); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 16 (1938).
[Vol. 18
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Recovery is limited to compensation for the damage which
actually resulted from the breach, and the amount sought may
not exceed the contract price for the services performed.24
D. Authority Conferred on Broker
Since a broker is a special agent, he cannot represent and bind
his principal beyond the limitations of the authority conferred
on him, and the ordinary authority of a broker is merely to find
a purchaser.
2 5
A broker's authority to sell the property exists only where the
intention of the principal to give such authority is manifest.
Without such specific authority he cannot accept a deposit, col-
lect purchase money, or deliver or accept a deed or possessions..2 6
Most courts sustain the view that the use of the words "for sale",
"to sell" and the like, in the broker's contract, does not give the
broker any authority to make a binding contract of sale on the
principal's behalf.27 It can be seen that a broker's authority is
strictly construed except that he has the implied powers to do any
act necessary to effect a purchase or sale of the property.28
II. Dums AND LiABmnr s oF A BRoim
A broker in carrying out his duties must exercise the same de-
gree of care and diligence that a prudent man would exercise
in a similar business. If he so acts he is not liable, in the absence
of fraud, for losses resulting to the principal. 29 He must act
within his authority and in compliance with the principal's in-
24. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 17 (1938).
25. Gallant v. Todd, 235 S.C. 428, 111 S.E.2d 779 (1960) ; Bolen v. Smith,
223 S.C. 39, 74 S.E2d 42 (1953) ; Yawkey v. Lowndes, 150 S.C. 493, 148 S.E.
554 (1929); Edwards v. Coleman, 139 S.C. 369, 138 S.E. 42 (1927) ; Schilling-
law v. Sims, 86 S.C. 76, 67 S.E. 906 (1910) ; Chandler v. Franklin, 65 S.C. 544,
44 S.E. 70 (1902); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1014 (1955) on broker's power to
bind principal; Annot., 30 A.L.R2d 805 (1953) on payment to broker autho-
rized to sell real estate as payment to principal. See 13 S.C.L.Q. 42 (1960) as
to the authority of real estate brokers.
26. Schillinglaw v. Sims, 86 S.C. 76, 67 S.E. 906 (1910).
27. In Gallant v. Todd, 235 S.C. 428, 111 S.E.2d 779 (1960), the words "I
hereby authorize to sell for me" were construed as not giving the broker the
right to sell the property but only to furnish a purchaser (Emphasis supplied).
In Schillinglaw v. Sims, 86 S.C. 76, 67 S.E. 906 (1910), a contract authorizing
a broker to "effect a sale" was held not to give the broker authority to com-
plete the sale (Emphasis supplied). In Bolen v. Smith, 223 S.C. 39, 74 S.E.2d
42 (1953), the court held that where parol authority of real estate agent to
execute a contract of sale in behalf of his principal is relied upon, proof
thereof must be clear and convincing.
28. See 12 Am. Jtm. 2d Brokers § 66 (1964).
29. See Annot., 94 A.L.R2d 468 (1964); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1357 (1929).
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structions. He must exercise reasonable skill and diligence in
transacting the business entrusted to him and is liable for any loss
for not doing so.8°
A broker acting as an agent occupies a fiduciary relationship
and must act with complete good faith and loyalty where the
interest of his principal is concerned.3 ' It is the broker's duty to
inform the principal of all the material facts concerning the
transaction or affecting his principal's interest.3 2 It is his further
duty to inform the principal if he knows of more advantageous
terms that could be obtained.
It is generally held that a purchasing broker cannot, without
fully disclosing his ownership or interest, sell to the principal
property which the broker owns or in which he has an individual
interest. Similarly, a broker, without the principal's full knowl-
edge and consent, cannot become the purchaser of the property
or any interest therein" or sell to his employees, partners, or near
relatives. 4
The form of action by a principal against his broker depends
on the nature of the breach of duty by the broker. An action in
the nature of assumpsit for money had and received may be
brought by the principal where the broker has money belonging
to the principal. 35 Where the broker's act is a tort as well as a
breach of contract, the principal may elect between a suit ex
contractu or a suit ex delicto. The measure of damages is ordi-
narily regulated by the rules governing damages in other civil
cases, and regardless of whether the suit is in tort or contract,
30. Williams v. McRae, 168 F. Supp. 650 (W.D.S.C. 1958) concerning a
peach broker; Lowrance v Swaffield, 123 S.C. 331, 116 S.E. 278 (1923).
31. See Annot's., 94 A.L.R2d 468 (1964), 62 A.L.R. 1357 (1929).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 381 (1958).
33. In Hallnan v. Lipscomb, 114 S.C. 171, 103 S.E. 513 (1920), it was held
that a broker abandons his position as agent to sell on commission by taking
a contract for sale of the land directly to himself since the positions of agent
to sell and of purchaser are conflicting. In McCallum v. Grier, 86 S.C. 162,
68 S.E. 466 (1910), it was held that where the broker's company purchased
land the broker was to sell, the contract was void at option of vendor. See
Annot., 62 A.L.R. 63 (1929).
34. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1307 (1952), on the duty to disclose that pros-
pective purchaser is a relative.
35. See Witsell v. Riggs, 14 Rich. Eq. 186 (S.C. 1867), where there was an
action against a real estate broker to recover damages where the broker had
held purchase money until it became valueless. The court held that the
measure of damages was the value of the currency at the time it was received
by the broker with interest thereon.
[Vol. 18
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the amount of damages is ordinarily compensation for the actual
loss or damage to the principal.3 6
II. CO PENSATION
A. Necessity of Contract
Ordinarily, a broker's compensation takes the form of a com-
mission on the price or value of the thing sold. His right to such
commission depends on the terms of his employment contract and
on his performing the requested service.3 7 As a general rule, a
contract of employment, either express or implied, is necessary
in order to entitle a broker to compensation for his performance.88
A promise by an alleged principal to pay a broker for services
already rendered without the principal's request is without pre-
sent consideration, and the broker can have no recovery thereon.
In order to recover upon a subsequent promise, there must have
been a pre-existing legal liability or obligation of some sort, as
where the services were rendered upon the request of the prom-
isor, although at the time the matter of compensation was not ex-
pressly considered.3 9
Before an implied contract can arise, the owner must say or
do something showing that he intended the broker to be his
agent. This action by the owner must be more than merely selling
to the party who was brought voluntarily to him by the broker.40
Similarly, the owner's mere consent to the rendition of the
broker's unsolicited services is not sufficient to justify the in-
ference that he intended to enter into contractual relations with
the broker and to pay him for his services. 41 If, however, the
owner of real estate so conducts himself in his dealings with a
broker that the broker, although a volunteer, has reason honestly
to believe that he has been employed to sell the property, the
owner is estopped to deny the employment and the liability to
pay therefor.42
36. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 57 (1938); Annot, 67 A.L.R.2d 952 (1959) as
to the principal's right to recover punitive damages for a broker's breach of
duty.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 445 (1958).
38. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers §§ 157-158 (1964); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 60
(1938).
39. Friedman v. Suttle, 10 Ariz. 57, 85 Pac. 726 (1906).
40. See 12 Am. Ju. 2d Brokers § 159 (1964); RESTATEMiENT (SEcoND),
AGENCY § 462 (1958).
41. Dickinson v. Hanley, 193 Mich. 585, 160 N.W. 389 (1916); Annot, 49
A.L.R. 933 (1927).
42. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers § 160 (1964); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 61
(1938); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 933 (1927).
1966] No~ns
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A contract to pay a reasonable commission may also be implied
from the owner's acceptance of a broker's voluntary services
rendered with an expectation of payment, provided the owner
knew or had reason to believe that such services were rendered
with an expectation of payment.43
A contractual right to commissions arises when an owner lists
his property with a broker or places it in his hands for sale and
a sale is made as a result of the broker's efforts. However, a
general listing of property for sale, without a special agreement
or payment of consideration, does not give rise to an enforceable
contract of employment. Such is merely an offer to pay a com-
mission and ripens into a contract only when the broker accepts
it by fulfilling its terms before the owner withdraws the offer.44
B. Compensation as Affected by Revocation
The principal may not defeat the broker's right to compensation
by revoking his authority when such authority is given for a
valuable consideration 6 or is coupled with an interest.46 By the
same token where the contract grants to the broker a certain
time within which he may effect a sale, the principal cannot re-
voke the agency before the expiration of the specified time and
defeat the broker's right to compensation.
47
Where a contract fixes no specific term of duration a broker is
not entitled to a commission on a sale made by the owner after
termination of the agency. It makes no difference that the vendee
was a person originally produced by the broker if the broker was
given a reasonable time and fair opportunity to consummate the
sale but failed to do so. The owner is liable, however, where he
fraudulently revokes the agency in the midst of negotiations and
makes the sale himself, at least where there is a strong likelihood
that the broker would have made the sale.
4 8
43. In Hester v. Roberts, 114 S.C. 410, 103 S.E. 773 (1920), evidence was
held insufficient to show that there was any contract between the parties or
that the defendant owner knowingly accepted the broker's services.
44. See 12 Am!. Jun. 2d Brokers § 159 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 361
(1938); 1 CoRBIN, CONnUTCS § 50 (1963) ; Annot., 49 A.L.R. 933 (1927).
45. McCallum v. Grier, 86 S.C. 162, 68 S.E. 466 (1910).
46. See cases cited note 15 supra.
47. Piper v. Wells, 175 Md. 326, 2 A.2d 28 (1938). 1 CoBIrN, CoNTRACrS
§ 50 (1963). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 450 (1958).
48. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 66 (1938).
[Vol. 18
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(. Compensation as Affected by an Unlicensed Broker
Questions have arisen as to the enforceability of a claim against
a broker who was acting without a license. A license is a pre-
requisite to acting as a real estate broker,49 and if the broker fails
to obtain such a license, whether he can recover compensation
for his services depends primarily upon whether the purpose of
the legislature was the enactment of a revenue measure or a police
regulation.50 The South Carolina statute requiring brokers to be
licensed has never been construed.51 However, in the majority of
cases involving a statute or ordinance expressly declaring it to be
unlawful for an unlicensed person to act as a broker, as the South
Carolina statute does, the courts, apparently construing the act
as a police regulation, have held that the contract of an unlicensed
broker for services was necessarily void and incapable of enforce-
ment.52 It is not necessary for a broker to be licensed when the
contract was made, but he must have had the license when the
services were rendered.53
D. Rate or Amount
When the broker has performed his part of the contract of
employment he is entitled to the rate or amount of compensation
fixed by the contract, or if no amount or rate is fixed, to reason-
able compensation. 54 If no amount is fixed and litigation occurs,
determination of what is a reasonable amount becomes a jury
question.55 Normally the full sale price of the property or in-
49. S. C. CoDE ANN. § 56-1545 (1962) requires brokers to be licensed and
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to act as a real estate broker
without first obtaining a license and any person violating the provisions of the
statute shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
50. See Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 178 (1964); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 67 (1938);
Annot, 169 A.L.R. 767 (1947).
51. However, in Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, the court held that a contract was
not void even though the broker did not have a license as required by an
.ordinance of the city of Charleston. The court, however, stressed the fact that
the ordinance did not expressly or by manifest intent declare the business
unlawful without license. By way of dictum the court said that ".... if the
law requiring a license actually and in terms declares that the business in
question is unlawful unless the requirement of a license is complied with, then
the carrying on of the business without such license is prohibited, and a con-
tract made under it cannot be enforced in a court of justice." 44 S.C. 227, 251-
52, 22 S.E. 108, 118 (1895).
52. See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 767 (1947).
53. See 12 Am. JL 2d Brokers § 179 (1964); 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 67
(1938).
54. Brachman v. Wheelock, Inc., 343 Mich. 230, 72 N.W.2d 246 (1955)
where compensation was fixed. Eadie v. Arc Wood Development, Inc., 189
N.Y.S.2d 340, 19 Misc. 2d 98 (1959) where amount was not specified.
55. See 12 Am. JuL 2d Brokers § 161 (1964).
19661
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terest actually sold is the basis for computing commissions for
the sale.5" However, if there is a contractual provision for some
other basis, such as the list price, the price of the property actual-
ly delivered, or the cash payment made by the purchaser, such
provision is necessarily controlling.57
E. Sufficienqy of Services
The broker's right to a commission depends on performance of
his part of the contract of employment and fulfillment of all the
conditions precedent in the contract. When he does not fulfill all
such conditions he is not entitled to a commission regardless of
the time, effort, and money he has expended. If the terms are
stipulated in the contract, the broker must procure a purchaser
who will accept such terms. If price or terms are not fixed, it
is necessary to secure an offer which is acceptable to the prin-
cipal. 8
The broker must conclude the negotiations he is authorized to
make to such a point that the minds of the principal and cus-
tomer meet with respect to all material or essential terms and an
agreement is entered into between them. Unless the contract of
employment provides otherwise, the broker's commission does not
depend on the final consummation of the transaction or the per-
formance of the agreement between the principal and the
customer.59
F. Producing Customerw ho is Able, Ready and Willing
In the absence of special contractual provisions to the contrary,
a broker has no right to a commission unless he produces a cus-
tomer who is able, ready and willing to buy or sell the property
concerned, on the terms the principal has prescribed, or terms
that are satisfactory to the principal. 0 He has earned his com-
mission whether or not a sale is consummated unless he waives
his right to a commission or causes the sale not to be consum-
mated. The only factors necessary to entitle the broker to a com-
mission are that an able, ready and willing customer has been
56. Zelkowitz v. Tobin, 108 Cal. App. 2d 69, 238 P.2d 19 (1951).
57. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 79 (1938).
58. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 83 (1938).
59. Charles S. Glassman Associates, Inc. v. Hallen Realty Corp., 235
N.Y.S.2d 215, 37 Misc. 2d 877 (1962), affd. 247 N.Y.S.2d 380, 20 App. Div.
2d 759 (1964).
60. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 85 (1938); RESTATMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY
§ 445 (1958) ; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 605 (1947).
[Vol. 18
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produced within the proper time, that he has offered to buy on
the principal's terms, and the principal has been given notice of
the purchaser.61
After the broker has performed, his right to a commission can-
not be defeated by the principal's subsequent addition of new or
additional terms. It is immaterial whether the customer is an
individual or company or that undisclosed persons join with the
disclosed parties so long as those disclosed were able, ready and
willing to consummate the deal. 62 The terms "ready" and "will-
ing" ordinarily give no trouble, but in determining whether a
prospective purchaser is "able" to meet the principal's terms many
factors must be considered.63 The word "able" ordinarily refers
to the prospective purchaser's financial ability. The financial
ability required of a customer is not necessarily his solvency or
ability to respond in damages but is his ability to meet the terms
of the principal.64 Aside from immediate cash payments when
the terms so require, the ability of a purchaser is not to be judged
exclusively by money in his possession or in his bank account.
Consideration should also be given to his assets, credit, financial
rating and anything else indicating his ability or lack of ability
to command the funds needed at the time they are required.65
G. Purchaser Willing to Buy on Different Terms
When a broker, instead of procuring a person who is ready,
able and willing to buy on the terms given to the broker by the
principal, procures a person who makes a counteroffer, the prin-
cipal may either accept the proposed counteroffer or refuse it
without giving the broker his reasons for refusal. If he accepts
the counteroffer he must pay the broker his commission, but
if he refuses he is not obligated to pay the broker.68 There have
61. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 85 (1938).
62. Ibid.
63. Of course, if the principal accepts the purchaser and enters into an
agreement with him, the broker is entitled to his commission with no question
as to ability, willingness or readiness. The problem arises when a purchaser is
produced who says he is able, ready and willing to meet the principal's terms,
but the principal refuses to consummate the sale. If it can in fact be shown that
the prospective purchaser was able, ready, and willing to meet the principal's
terms, the broker can recover his commission whether or not the principal in
fact sells to the prospective purchaser.
64. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 85 (1938).
65. Ibid.
66. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers § 185 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 86
(1938); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 447 (1958).
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been, however, a few cases where a contrary result has been
reached. For example where the variation in terms would have
been beneficial to the principal or where the deviation was so
trivial as to make it obvious that the principal was merely seeking
to avoid his contract with the broker, the principal has been held
to be obligated to pay the broker a commission.67
When a listing agreement fails to fix the terms for the sale or
specifies only part of the terms with the understanding that the
principal and customer will fill in the details, the principal has
been held free to cease negotiations without being liable to the
broker. In such a situation the broker is entitled to his com-
mission only when the principal and customer reach an agree-
ment.08 Unless otherwise agreed, he is not entitled to his com-
mission for negotiating a conditional or option contract unless
such an agreement or option is subsequently carried out.69
H. Pro&uring Clause
Under the ordinary brokerage contract, the broker must be
the efficient or procuring cause of the sale or other transaction
he is employed to negotiate before he is entitled to his com-
mission; i.e., his efforts or services must be the direct cause of
the sale.70 Whether or not the broker is the procuring cause is a
question of fact for the jury if litigation occurs.71 "Procuring
cause," "efficient cause" and "proximate cause" are often used
interchangeably. They all refer to a setting in motion of a series
67. See 12 Am. Jim. 2d Brokers § 185 (1964); 1 CoarnN, CONTRACTS § 50
(1963); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 376 (1951).
68. See 12 A-At. JuR. 2d Brokers § 187 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
AGENCY § 445 (1958).
69. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 188 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 86
(1938); 23 A.L.R. 856 (1923).
70. In Kolb v. Nash, 245 S.C. 25, 138 S.E.2d 417 (1964), a broker was
allowed to recover his commission when the landowner sold the property to a
purchaser whose interest in the property was engendered by the broker's
efforts. In Hobbs v. Hudgens, 223 S.C. 88, 74 S.E.2d 425 (1953), the broker
was denied his commission where the broker did introduce the customer to the
principal. It was noted, however, that the purchaser's attention was not called
to the subject matter by the broker through means intended to cause a sale,
and the purchaser had already learned of property and made up his mind to
negotiate. See Cleveland and Williams v. Butler, 94 S. C. 406, 78 S.E. 81
(1913). In Goldsmith v. Coxe, 80 S.C. 341, 61 S.E. 555 (1908), a broker was
given an exclusive right to sell property. He was allowed to recover his
commission when the owner sold to one with whom the broker had been
negotiating. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 448 (1958); Annot., 9
A.L.R. 1194 (1920).
71. Kolb v. Nash, 245 S.C. 25, 138 S.E.2d 417 (1964) ; Crook v. Hallett, 166
S.C. 230, 164 S.E. 641 (1932); Goldsmith v. Coxe, 80 S.C. 341, 61 S.E. 555
(1908).
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of events, which, without a break in their continuity, result in
procuring a ready, willing and able purchaser.72 The negotia-
tions have not been interrupted so long as the broker can estab-
lish the continuity of his agency in bringing the transaction to
a conclusion.73 However, if the negotiations are halted and the
broker ceases his efforts, or there is a substantial break in negoti-
ations and the principal thereafter concludes the transaction
without the broker's aid, the broker may be denied any com-
mission.7 4
It is often said that before the broker can be the procuring
cause of a sale, he must first call the purchaser's attention to the
property and start negotiations which culminate in a sale. The
mere fact, however, that the broker informed the customer of the
matter, showed him the property involved, or introduced the cus-
tomer to the principal, does not necessarily make him the pro-
curing cause.75 The broker may be deemed the procuring cause
if such information or introduction is the foundation upon which
negotiations are begun and the transaction consummated.70
Similarly, if the broker may be deemed the procuring cause in
other respects, it is immaterial that the broker did not personally
introduce the principal to the customer, or never saw the cus-
tomer, or was not the first to bring the property to the customer's
attention.7 7 He may also be the procuring cause even though he
is not present during or takes no part in the negotiations between
the parties or the closing of the bargain.
7 8
To be entitled to his commission, a broker must perform his
part of the contract of employment within the time set out in
the contract or, where no time is specified, within a reasonable
72. In Pinson v. Smith AtL Realty Co., 118 S.C. 262, 110 S.E. 392 (1922),
the court said that in order to procure contracts, one must be the efficient
cause of securing the contract. In Goldsmith v. Coxe, 80 S.C. 341, 61 S.E. 555
(1908), the court held that the broker will be regarded as the procuring cause
if his intervention is the foundation upon which the negotiations resulting in
the sale are begun.
73. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers § 190 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 91
(1938).
74. Ibid.
75. In Hobbs v. Hudgens, 223 S.C. 88, 74 S.E.2d 425 (1953), the broker
was not the procuring cause where he introduced the customer to the principal
because the customer knew of the opportunity and had already made up his
mind to negotiate. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 448 (1958).
76. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers § 190 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 91
(1938).
77. Ibid.
78. Smith v. Peeples, 177 S.C. 479, 181 S.E. 653 (1935); Charles v. West,
155 S.C. 488, 152 S.E. 644 (1930) ; Hutson v. Stone, 119 S.C. 259, 112 S.E. 39
(1922).
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time.70 Where he produces a buyer within the time allowed, his
right to a commission is not affected by the fact that the sale is
not consummated until after the termination of the agencys °
Where the broker was the procuring cause for the presence of
a customer but the owner sold to such customer in ignorance of
this fact, the broker is entitled to his commission unless the con-
tract of employment requires notice."' If, however, the owner
reduces the price without knowledge that the broker has pro-
cured a customer and is prejudiced by the broker's failure to give
him notice, some courts have refused to allow the broker to re-
cover even though he was the procuring cause. Other courts have
allowed recovery in this situation. 2
I. Exclusive Agency or Exclusive Right of Sale
A distinction is often raised between an exclusive agency to
sell and an exclusive right of sale. It is generally held that where
an exclusive agency is given, the owner may still sell the prop-
erty unless the broker has procured a purchaser prior to such
sale." The only effect of such a provision is to prevent the owner
from placing the property in the hands of other agents., If the
owner does not give an exclusive agency he may place his prop-
erty in the hands of as many brokers as he desires. In the event
of a sale in a situation such as this, only one commission is to be
paid, and that is to be paid in full to the broker who first suc-
ceeds as the procuring cause of the transaction."
On the other hand, where a broker is given an exclusive right
to sell property he is generally held entitled to his commission
when a sale is made by the owner, and it is immaterial that the
79. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. 784 (1923).
80. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953).
81. In DuRant v. Lubs, 142 S.C. 33, 140 S.E. 249 (1927), the jury was
instructed that a broker had forfeited his right to claim a commission by his
failure to give the principal notice that he had interested the purchaser in the
property. This instruction was held to be reversible error.
82. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848 (1956).
83. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 395 (1929).
84. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 936 (1963). In Mordecai v. Jacobi, 12 Rich.
Law 547 (S.C. 1860) (concerning selling of slaves) a broker was employed
under a contract not giving him the exclusive right to act. The court held that
the broker was not entitled to a commission where the owner sells in good
faith to a purchaser before the broker has performed and notified the owner
of such performance.
85. In Hutson v. Stone, 119 S.C. 259, 112 S.E. 39 (1922), the court held that
where a broker undertook to sell real estate in competition with others, an
implied condition of his employment was that a prior sale by any one of the
other brokers would revoke his authority and terminate his agency.
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broker was not the procuring cause thereof. 86 In this situation,
however, the employment contract must have been supported by
consideration and cannot be merely a unilateral offer.8 7 Regard-
ing the consideration aspect, it has been held that a broker's ex-
penditure of time or money in an effort to find a purchaser or
his completion of his undertaking is a sufficient consideration to
transform the agreement from unilateral to bilateral and make
it binding. 8
J. Failure of Prinoipal or Customer to Complete Transaotion
Generally when a broker finds a customer ready, able and will-
ing to enter into a transaction on the terms set forth by the
principal, the broker, in the absence of a contrary provision, can-
not be deprived of his commission if the principal causes the
transaction to fail. 9 This is not true where the principal has
valid grounds for his refusal such as where a customer insists
on a material change in terms or where the contract if executed
would be fraudulent or usurious. The criteria are that his re-
fusal must not be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, wrongful or
fraudulent. 90
The fact that the principal's inability to complete the trans-
action is involuntary, as where the property is condemned or fore-
closed upon, is not sufficient to defeat the broker's right to his
commission.9" Further, a broker is entitled to his commission even
if the principal's failure to complete the transaction was due to a
defect in his title of which the broker had no notice. 92 This rule
rests upon the theory that the broker is entitled to assume that
the principal's title is marketable, and therefore he has no duty
to inquire as to the existence of a defect.93 The presumption that
the principal's title is marketable may, of course, be waived by
86. See RFSTATEMENT (SEcomN), AGENCY § 449 (1958); Annot., 88 A.L.R.
2d 936 (1963).
87. See 12 AM. JuR. 2d Brokers § 226 (1964).
88. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 32 (1964); 1 CoRmN, CONTRACTS § 50
(1963).
89. See 12 Am. Jun. 2d Brokers § 199 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 95
(1938); Annot, 169 A.L.R. 605 (1947). See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d 1244
(1960) on the broker's return of deposit money to customer as a waiver of
his right to commissions.
90. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 95 (1938).
91. Ibid.
92. See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 201 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 95
(1938); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 605 (1947).
93. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1398 (1945).
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the acts of the parties or resist implication where the facts dictate
otherwise.0 4 A principal may protect himself from having to pay
a commission where a defective title prevents consummation of
the sale. He may do this by making the broker's right dependent
upon the purchaser's acceptance of title, the principal's ability to
perform, or the consummation of the transaction. 5 The cases
in this area are in conflict apparently because of the varying
terminology of the contracts of employment.
Where the sale fails because of a deficiency in the quantity of
land represented by the principal, a broker may recover his com-
mission.00 He may be denied his commission, however, where the
lot was to be sold "as such" and not by the "front foot," even
though there was a deficiency in the represented size.
97
As to the customer's refusal to consummate the transaction, it
is the general rule, in the absence of a contrary provision, that
a broker has a right to his commission when a valid contract is
drawn up between the principal and customer. This right is not
defeated even though the customer defaults, refuses to consum-
mate the contract, is financially unable to carry it out, or the
owner subsequently releases the purchaser from the contract.98
H-lowever, where commissions are dependent on some condition
such as completion, consummation, or closing of the sale and
this condition never occurs, the broker may be denied his
commission. 00
Riciu E. IloPsoN
94. Leonard v. Vaughan & Co., 117 Va. 514, 85 S.E. 471 (1915).
95. Wagner v. Derecktor, 306 N.Y. 386, 118 N.E.2d 570 (1954); Annot.,
169 A.L.R. 605 (1947).
96. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 95 (1938).
97. Baer v. Otts, 130 S.C. 348, 126 S.E. 44 (1925).
98. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 437 (1960).
99. In Hamrick v. Cooper River Lumber Co., 223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E2d 575
(1953), a broker was denied his commission where the contract said the broker
was to be paid "on date of settlement" and the purchaser refused to carry out
the contract. See Murray v. Texas Co., 172 S.C. 399, 174 S.E. 231 (1934);
Charles v. West, 155 S.C. 488, 152 S.E. 644 (1930).
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